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Cegavske v. Hollowood, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 46 (June 28, 2022)1
STATUTORY APPLICATION: APPLICABILITY OF NRS 295.026 IN BALLOT
INITIATIVE MATTERS
Summary
In an opinion drafted by Justice Stiglich, the Court considered whether initiative sponsors
may withdraw a petition or whether an initiative petition’s signatories or the public acquire any
rights in a petition. This appeal involves two verified initiative petitions to place questions on the
ballot for the Nevada 2022 general election and the sponsors' withdrawal of the initiative petitions.
Although Nevada law provides a procedure to withdraw an initiative petition and directs that “no
further action may be taken on [a withdrawn] petition,”2 Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske
refused to honor the withdrawals of the two petitions at issue here. The sponsors then sought and
obtained writs of mandamus and prohibition from the district court to compel her to recognize the
withdrawals and thereby prevent the questions from appearing on the 2022 ballot. The Secretary
of State appealed, arguing that the statute setting forth the withdrawal procedure, NRS 295.026, is
unconstitutional. The Court concluded that NRS 295.026 is a permissible exercise of the
Legislature's power to enact statutes to facilitate the people's initiative power and is thus not
unconstitutional, finding that the district court abused its discretion in issuing a writ of prohibition.
Facts and Procedural History
This opinion comes from an appeal from an Eighth Judicial District Court order granting
writs of mandamus and prohibition barring the Secretary of State from placing initiative petition
questions on the ballot. Respondents Robert Hollowood, Kenneth Belknap, Nevadans for Fair
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NEV. REV. STAT. § 295.026(2).

Gaming Taxes PAC, and Fund Our Schools PAC sponsored two initiative petitions for the
purposes of funding education via an increase in Nevada sales tax and a tax on gaming. The
Legislature did not act on the initiative petitions, but did reach an agreement to increase taxes to
fund education. Thereafter, Hollowood and Belknap each filed a petition withdrawal form with the
Secretary of State's office.
The Attorney General’s subsequent opinion (1) framed the Secretary of State's role as
ministerial, (2) found no constitutional provisions limiting withdrawal of an initiative petition such
that there was no direct conflict between the constitution and the statute, (3) interpreted NRS
295.026 as imposing a procedural right permitting sponsors to withdraw a petition, and (4)
concluded that the Secretary's duty to place a matter on the ballot was owed to the sponsors and
would be waived by the sponsors’ withdrawal of the petition.3 The Secretary disagreed and
concluded that she had a constitutional duty to place verified initiative petitions on the ballot, and
thus refused to recognize the sponsors' withdrawal. Originally, the district court concluded that
NRS 295.026 permissibly expands initiative sponsors' rights by providing a clear procedure and
deadlines to withdraw a petition. The court held that the Secretary's duty to place a matter on the
ballot presupposed a valid petition, further stating that a withdrawal consistent with NRS 295.026
makes the petition void and thus no longer valid.
Discussion
A writ of prohibition is not appropriate to bar the Secretary of State’s ministerial action
The Court began by resolving the Secretary’s challenge to the writ of prohibition. The
Secretary argued that the order failed to identify any judicial or quasijudicial functions being
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carried out, making it deficient. The Court agreed, stating that “in addition to barring the extrajurisdictional exercise of judicial power, a writ of prohibition may be issued to curtail the
inappropriate exercise of quasi-judicial power,4 but the writ does not serve to curtail the exercise
of ministerial power.”5 Using this precedent, the Court determined that the district court erred in
concluding that the Secretary of State was subject to a writ of prohibition in this context, thus
reversing the district court’s order to the extent that it issued a writ of prohibition.
Mandamus relief was warranted to compel the Secretary of State to take no action on the
withdrawn initiative petitions.
The Secretary argued that the Nevada Constitution does not permit withdrawal of an
initiative petition after the signatures have been verified and that she was obligated to place the
initiative petitions’ questions on the ballot after the Legislature did not act on them. The Court
here, however, disagreed with this argument and affirmed the portion of the district court order
granting a writ of mandamus. The Court acknowledged that the challenger must “overcome the
presumption that a statute is constitutional with a clear showing of invalidity.”6 The Court then
determined that the state constitution would need to be read as a whole, and “the interpretation of
a statute or constitutional provision will be harmonized with other statutes or provisions to avoid
unreasonable or absurd results.”7 The Court further conveyed that Article 19, Section 2 of the
Nevada Constitution sets forth the people's power to propose or amend a statute, and to propose a
constitutional amendment, providing that “the people reserve to themselves the power to propose,
by initiative petition, statutes and amendments to statutes and amendments to this Constitution,
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and to enact or reject them at the polls.”8 The Court recognized that the Legislature has adopted a
procedure to withdraw an initiative petition that would need to be followed here.9
The Secretary of State has not shown that Article 19 creates public rights that are violated by
withdrawal of a verified initiative petition
Regarding this matter, the Secretary of State first argued that the initiative-petition process
vests a right held by the individuals who signed the initiative petition or the voting public in general
that precludes the withdrawal of a verified petition. The Court, however, immediately determined
that the authorities the Secretary relied on to argue that NRS 295.026 infringes on public rights are
unavailing.10 The Secretary cited Rea for the proposition that the initiative process consists of the
power to propose a law that must then proceed to a vote at the polls. The Court responded by
distinguishing Rea, clarifying that Rea held that the initiative power reserved to the municipality's
electors was the power to propose laws; and such proposed laws would not be enacted through the
initiative petition process itself but only after approval by the voters.11 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the Secretary of State had not shown that NRS 295.026 is unconstitutional on the
premise that it violates the constitutional rights of initiative petition signatories or the public.
Withdrawal voids the initiative petitions such that there is no question for the Secretary of State
to place on the ballot
The Secretary of State next argued that NRS 295.026 conflicts with the duty that she “shall”
place a question on the ballot following the Legislature's inaction on the petition. However, the
Court found her argument to be unpersuasive when considered in light of precedent establishing
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that a withdrawn petition is void and the Secretary of State has no duty to act with respect to a void
petition.12 Rogers held that “an initiative (is?) void when it failed to comply with the constitutional
requirement that a proposal making an appropriation must be offset by a sufficient tax.”13 The
Secretary of State argued that this court has held that a petition must be placed on the ballot even
if it may be unconstitutional and thus futile, citing Greater Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce.14
However, the Court reiterated Herbst, concluding that “[w]here an initiative sponsor has filed a
petition withdrawal form with the Secretary of State to render the initiative void, there is a
procedural deficiency, not a substantive deficiency with the proposal.”15 Thus, the Court concluded
that NRS 295.026(2)'s directive that “no further action may be taken on [a] petition, after it has
been withdrawn renders a withdrawn initiative petition void.”16 The Court finalized its holding by
stating that a void petition is excluded from the initiative process set forth in Article 19, which
construes NRS 295.026 in a way that is constitutional and neither absurd nor unreasonable.
NRS 295.026 facilitates the provisions in Article 19 guaranteeing the initiative power to the
people
The Secretary of State then contended that NRS 295.026 does not facilitate the provisions
of Article 19 but instead infringes on rights reserved to the people. The Court countered this stance
by reiterating that NRS 295.026 does not infringe on the reservation provision stated in Article 19,
Section 2(1). Accordingly, the Court concluded that NRS 295.026 facilitates the operation of
Article 19 and thus is a constitutional exercise of the Legislature's Article 19, Section 5 authority.
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Mandamus is appropriate
The Court concluded by reemphasizing that NRS 295.026(2) provides that no action may
be taken when a petition has been withdrawn pursuant to its terms and thus bars the Secretary of
State from acting on the initiative petitions. The Court claimed that prior case law compels the
Secretary not to place the initiatives' questions on the ballot, and the district court did not abuse its
discretion in issuing a writ of mandamus.17
Conclusion
Relying on NRS 295.026, which provides that no action may be taken on a petition that
has been timely withdrawn, the Court ruled that a withdrawn petition would be void. The Court
used this rationale to emphasize that because the petitions in this matter are therefore void, the
Secretary's duty to place them on the ballot has been nullified, consistent with their precedent
barring placement of void initiative petitions on the ballot, regardless of whether they have been
verified. Thereafter, the Court affirmed the district court's grant of mandamus relief but reversed
the district court order to the extent that it granted a writ of prohibition.
Concurrence in part; dissent in part
The opinion is joined by a concurrence in part and dissent in part by Justice Hardesty,
Silver and Pickering, who state that the plain language of Article 19, Section 2 provides the correct
guidance and that there is no ambiguity in the relevant constitutional provisions here.
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